Our previous newsletter focused on Hamas jihadi strategies and preparations prior to its October 7, 2023 murderous attack on Israel. Also considered was how much the IDF, SHABAK (Israel’s General Security Services) and AMAN (IDF Military Intelligence) were aware of Hamas intelligence, and how much the IDF relied on the accuracy of its own intelligence findings.
This newsletter will offer some background on two issues related to the October 7 atrocities; first, some highly unprofessional and negligent conduct (specifically on the part of the IDF/AMAN); and second, the actual timeline of events surrounding October 6-7. Most of this information is found in OSINT (open-source intelligence), but most reporting of events leaves out or spins many of the available facts.
Drop your guns
After the Israeli army completed its hi-tech anti-tunnel barrier along the seam between Gaza and Israeli kibbutzim and farms in April 2021, the IDF concluded that the chance of terrorist incursions from Gaza was now “close to nil,” and that kibbutz rapid response squads of only 5-10 armed warriors would be sufficient as the last line of defense for these communities. The locals were deeply concerned, but “as much as we banged on the table, it didn’t help,” said one local security coordinator.
On October 7, 2023, Kibbutz Nahal Oz’s civilian emergency response team was forced to defend their community against up to 180 Hamas terrorists. However, they were faced with an insurmountable problem. The IDF had decided a few years back that it was too much of a security threat for rifles to be ‘hanging around the kibbutz.’ So all the M-16’s were collected and deposited in a kibbutz armory. But when Hamas broke into Nahal Oz, the armory instantly became inaccessible as it was covered in a hail of bullets. And the man who held the key to the armory was murdered by Hamas, leaving the squad unable to access the weaponry.
Said team leader Barry Meirovitch. “If we had weapons on October 7, then some of [the response team] would have been killed, but we would have saved more people. We found ourselves in the most absurd situation. When it came down to it, I had all the gear, including a radio, a flak jacket, and magazines, but I didn’t have a gun.” Sixty soldiers and 15 kibbutz members were murdered in that attack.
When Hamas terrorists rolled into the Negev town of Sderot on white Toyota pickup trucks, the 22 members of that town’s civilian alert squad also had no semi-automatic weapons – they had been returned to IDF armories. The squads were equipped only with personal handguns, severely limiting their ability to engage the dozens of Hamas terrorists who stormed the town. The mayor of Sderot Lyor Davidi was entirely unaware that members of the town’s alert squad lacked automatic weapons. He only discovered this fact on the day of the attack. A total of 53 people were killed in Sderot: 37 civilians, 11 police officers, 2 firefighters, and 1 IDF soldier
“His watchmen are blind, … ignorant and dumb” (Isaiah 56:10)
At age 27, Israeli ham-radio enthusiast Rafael Hayun began to intercept Hamas communications and to send the processed information to Unit 8200 (AMAN SIGINT). The IDF thankfully provided Hayun with monitoring equipment. According to IDF testimonies, Hayun’s SIGINT often reached units in the field before official army channels, saving lives and foiling Hamas terror attacks and ambushes.
In late 2019, Hayun began reporting on Hamas training exercises involving plans to invade Israel, penetrate the security fence at multiple points, take over communities, and commit mass murder and kidnapping. Over time, the Hamas training became more intense and detailed. Hayun alerted the units he was working with about Hamas’s activities in real time.
In late 2022, a senior IDF officer (Col. G.) who headed the Military Censorship and Information Security Department under AMAN decided to block Hayun’s direct contact with field commanders, arguing that the IDF did not require such civilian assistance. A recording of this conversation was released in September 2024 by journalist Almog Boker.
Colonel G., head of the Security Department in the IDF, “appealed to the Ministry of Communications to revoke [Hayun’s] license. Hayun was called for a hearing on April 3, 2023, and “the Director General of the Ministry of Communications told me to close down my system and stop listening to the enemy. I did as I was told and in June [2023] they informed me that my license had been revoked. Two months later, on August 20 [2023], inspectors came to my home to make sure I had complied with orders.” Five months before the October 7 assault, in May 2023, AMAN was ordered to seize all of Hayun’s equipment and stop working with him. Around the same time, the IDF’s Intelligence Directorate Unit 8200 SIGINT unit also stopped monitoring Hamas’s communications.
Hayun said that his military colleagues told him that the order to cut him off came from “senior leadership,” and they had no explanation for the decision. Hayun told reporters he is convinced that if he had been listening in the weeks before Oct. 7, the invasion would have been prevented.
Hayun says that on May 23, 2023 he sent a message to Colonel G., after Hamas fired on Sderot and several residents were injured, “I wrote him a very poignant and direct message, saying ‘You should know that the victims’ blood is on your hands.’ ‘G.’ answered and warned me not to write to him again.”
Hayun says that an examination of the radios Hamas’ Nukhba terrorists had when entering Israel were all calibrated to frequencies that he had been listening to until his devices were taken and his license revoked. “I met a number of senior officers in different military units. We went over the frequencies. I had all these frequencies in my devices that were confiscated six months earlier. I would have heard everything.”
As for the explanations for what happened before and on October 7th (including the confiscation of his ‘electronic ears’) Hayun responds: “A lot of things that I know about don’t fit properly into the puzzle. I won’t say that it was something intentional or someone from the inside. I’ll just say that there are many things that I couldn’t fit properly in the huge puzzle of that day.”
“The pump don’t work”
IDF spotters and commanders in the AMAN border units monitoring surveillance balloons along the Gaza perimeter conveyed to their superiors in the weeks before October 7, 2023 that three observation blimps were grounded and out of action. As a result, the soldiers who operated them – concentrated in a small number of operations rooms – were unable to relay information and warn troops on October 7 as 6,000 jihadis swarmed across the bulldozed security barrier. At the IDF Nahal Oz base, a balloonist and his four comrades engaged Hamas in a lengthy battle, managing to kill ten terrorists. But the IDF soldiers were outnumbered and were all found dead inside a mobile shelter at 14:30, October 7, 2023.
On your walls, O Jerusalem
In April 2021, a hi-tech barrier wall was completed by the IDF along the cease-fire line between Israel and Gaza. It was considered a groundbreaking defense project, utilizing autonomous systems, robotics, and advanced surveillance – all to stop Hamas infiltration from Gaza.
Yet a senior officer said, “They told residents the above-ground fence would prevent infiltration, but it wasn’t even built for that. It was only meant to delay attackers by 15 minutes. It didn’t respond to explosives, not even to a tractor.”
The Philistines have invaded
The IDF have a order-of-battle code-named “Parash Pleshet” (‘the Philistine has invaded’). It is intended to block enemy invasions. Unfortunately Israel was not ready for the magnitude of this invasion. The IDF’s Gaza Division had not adequately prepared for the most extreme potential scenario.
Maj. Gen. (res.) Uri Sagi, a former head of Military Intelligence, explains that SHABAK is an organization focused on terrorism. “It speaks about ‘infiltrations,’ about ‘terrorist attacks,’ not about war, which is the language Military Intelligence speaks . . . The problem began long before this tragic night; namely, senior military officials were unfamiliar with Hamas’ plans and could not even imagine them.”
The IDF intelligence consensus was that Hamas would not be attacking. As a result, troops were thinned out and sent home for Shabbat furlough. Two companies of troops from the IDF’s Commando Brigade, which had been deployed to the Gaza border during the Jewish holiday season in September and October, were sent to the West Bank just two days before the October 7 massacre. The IDF’s failure to grasp what was about to happen was based on “a lot of arrogance,” says Gen. Israel Ziv. The thought was that “Hamas wouldn’t attack, wouldn’t dare, and that even if so, they are not capable. We went to sleep on the 6th thinking there’s a cat over there, and we woke up on the 7th and there’s a tiger.”
At 05:30 on October 7, 2023, IDF Golani soldiers were preparing to start out on their dawn jeep patrol along the Gaza Strip, on the Israeli side of the fence – a regular morning activity. But suddenly they were instructed by their superiors to delay the patrol and to stand back because of a threat from anti-tank missiles, three of these soldiers told the BBC. “There was a warning. It was forbidden to go up the route next to the fence,” one recalls. Golani soldier 21-year-old Shimon Malka, said such a warning was unusual but not unheard of, so they gave it little thought.
IDF Gen. Israel Ziv says it is standard IDF protocol to ‘stand soldiers back’ during suspected attacks like this so they can “avoid being exposed as a target.” But, he says, “Hamas realized that and used it” to their advantage.
The timeline of October 6, 2023
21:00 SHABAK (also known as the Shin Bet security agency) starts to identify SIGINT that Hamas was beginning to activate specially pre-positioned Israeli cell-phone SIMs – at first, a handful of SIMs, but exactly at midnight, 1,000 SIMs are activated simultaneously by Hamas. SHABAK updates IDF Gaza Division chief Brig. Gen. Avi Rosenfeld and Southern Command chief Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman via WhatsApp at 21:30. Top Hamas commanders and their families begin to descend into the rat’s nest of tunnels spread throughout Gaza – more extensive than that of the entire London underground,
23:00 SHABAK chief Ronen Bar (who is then at his home) briefs IDF Gaza Division chief Brig. Gen. Avi Rosenfeld and other IDF and AMAN officers about “unusual indications” in the field.
23:30 Various Hamas activities are detected (also at 00:00, 02:30 and 03:00), considered and then dismissed. AMAN officials continue to look into activities, and their conclusion is that nothing unusual is occurring.
The timeline of October 7, 2023
00:00 One thousand Nuhkba terrorists simultaneously activate Israel SIM cards in their cell phones. The purpose of using the Israeli SIM cards is for the jihadis to improve their ability to communicate with each other while moving through the territory of Israel and carrying out their attacks.
01:00 SHABAK issues an intelligence report: “A sequence of concerning signs indicates Hamas is preparing for an attack. At the same time, field indicators suggest routine and restraint, with the background of a recently agreed ‘understanding’ leading to the assessment that Hamas is not interested in escalation or starting a campaign at this time.”
01:30 IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi’s office manager is updated about the latest SHABAK report, and then by the IDF Maj. Gen. in charge of Southern Command.
02:45 SHABAK Southern Region sends out an intelligence summary to high-ranking officers and officials: “Today and yesterday there were SIMs in certain areas of Gaza. This is not unusual, since similar tests were carried out by Hamas last year as well. According to the division and the command, Hamas has not changed its routine. The information is preliminary and there are routine activities in Hamas. A discussion on the matter will be held by the Southern Command Intelligence Officer at 08:30 and by the Southern Command heads at 10:00.” The head of IDF Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman, asks, “Are we on alert?” He is answered in the negative.
02:58/03:03 SHABAK sends out an urgent alert to several official bodies including the Israel Police and the National Security Council. “We have an indication of activation and activity of Hamas’s communication network across several brigades. We lack details on the nature of the activity, though the cumulative unusual activity, alongside additional indicators, may point to an offensive action.” At most, the Israeli intelligence agencies think there might be an attempt for a minor kidnapping of a small group of Border Patrol soldiers
03:12 SHABAK says that the chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate, Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva, then-head of Unit 8200, Brig. Gen. Yossi Sariel, and then-head of the Research Division, Brig. Gen. Amit Saar, IDF Southern Command chief Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman are alerted via WhatsApp for the first time by an AMAN officer in the IDF Southern Command identified by the initial “Aleph” to what he recognizes as “something extremely unusual going on – heightened readiness on the other side [in Gaza].” In actuality, Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva, head of AMAN (the Intelligence Directorate) is not involved up to this point, as he is vacationing in Eilat. He is later updated by his office manager that a call had been received.
03:21 IDF Chief of Staff Halevi, who is also at home at the time, is awakened by the IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Matan Feldman. IDF Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, who once served as head of bureau for former IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon, notes: “If the Chief of Staff gets up at night, it’s because we’re on the brink of an abyss. You don’t wake the Chief of Staff for nothing” Halevi immediately understands that he is about to receive intelligence that will require his full attention, so he asks Feldman to arrange a conference call in a few minutes.
03:30 HaLevi, IDF Operations Directorate head Maj. Gen. Oded Basiuk and head of IDF Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman are now all updated on the signs of an imminent attack. Halevi requests more information. He also orders that the intelligence information be checked – including from a perspective skeptical of the prevailing assumption that Hamas is not interested in war. He orders an update sent to the Israeli Air Force. Halevi requests to arrange a telephone consultation with Finkelman in order to make a situational assessment, but Finkelman is mid-assessment with his intelligence officer. They decide to hold a call at around 4:20 a.m. While he is waiting, Halevi writes on a paper: “Don’t convince ourselves that this is nothing.”
Maj. Gen. Finkelman does most of the talking during the call. He tells Halevi and Basiuk the details and emphasizes the dilemmas – namely that the intelligence establishment believes Hamas is merely conducting a drill, but the stricter interpretation argues that there is a real intention to carry out a pin-point infiltration, although not in an immediate timeframe. The conference call with Halevi takes place sometime between 03:30 and 04:00 and lasts no more than fifteen minutes.
04:00 SHABAK holds a meeting (though the head of SHABAK is not yet present). No alerts are passed on to PM Netanyahu, to the head of Israeli Police, to Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (a former head of the Gaza Brigade and subsequently of Southern Command), to IAF chief Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar or to Navy chief Vice Adm. David Saar Salama.
A former Shin Bet official interviewed on Professor Gadi Taub’s Hebrew podcast said that the Shin Bet thought Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar had embarked on a path of moderation to improve the living conditions in Gaza. In the context of that mindset, they interpreted the signs of increased Hamas activity as preparations for a possible Israeli incursion. Bar and the top SHABAK brass feared that any upping of the level of alert would trigger Hamas and start a war. Alternatively, they feared the IDF might launch a preemptive strike with the same result.
The head of SHABAK Ronen Bar “did not awaken the prime minister because he feared that Netanyahu would make the wrong decision and trigger a major war with Hamas. Instead, he decided to make the [decision] himself – one of the most fateful in the history of Israel – rather than leaving it to the duly elected prime minister.”
04:00 Hamas begins to gather its forces. Nukhba terrorists are told to go to mosques for morning prayers. There they receive precise orders, passed on by word of mouth, to report at certain points along the border fence at 06:00. At the staging points, the terrorists receive weapons, ammunition, maps, and written orders. It is only then that most of them realize, for the first time, that they are headed to war.
04:20 The ‘Chief of Staff situational assessment’ takes place by encrypted phone calls. These meetings can last between 15 and 60 minutes. The participants in the situational assessment are COS HaLevi, OC Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Finkelman, and the head of the Operations Directorate, Maj. Gen. Oded Basiuk. Halevi asks during the conversation why there is no Military Intelligence official on the line, but does not insist on a MI representative being present. Halevi brings up potential actions by Hamas, including infiltrations from the sea, from the air, or using tunnels. He gives orders to increase surveillance on Hamas, and states that a new assessment would be convened at 8:30 a.m. or earlier if new information is received. From 3:30 a.m., there is no new information coming from the Gaza Strip.
04:00 to 05:00 Numerous calls are held between Southern Command and the IAF regarding the deployment of drones. It is decided to move one helicopter to the Ramon Airbase in the Negev Israel, to shorten the distance it needs to fly to the Gaza Strip.
4:30 SHABAK chief Ronen Bar arrives at SHABAK HQ in Tel Aviv and convenes a meeting with regional heads. Possible scenarios discussed include Hamas staging a localized surprise raid or a kidnapping. Intelligence and operational responses are prepared. A ‘Tequila’ Special Forces team composed of SHABAK fighters and Israel Border Police’s Yamam National Counter-Terrorism Unit, designed to deal with localized raids, is sent out after 4:30 am..
04:30 to 05:20 Another meeting is held at 4:30 a.m. chaired by head of the Operations Directorate, Maj. Gen. Oded Basiuk. The directorate, responsible for mobilizing and reinforcing IDF forces, reinforces aerial reconnaissance by sending one combat helicopter and three reconnaissance UAVs with no offensive capabilities. These UAVs would later look down from above at Israeli civilians being abducted into Gaza, unable to respond.
05:15 Ronen Bar writes in the protocol that he issues orders to brief Maj. Gen. Avi Gil. (Prime Minister Netanyahu’s military secretary). But Maj. Gen. Avi Gil notes that he was briefed on the still ambiguous situation only at 6:15 AM, He didn’t have time to wake Netanyahu up and called him only at 6:29 a.m. when the attack had already commenced
05:30 Israel Air Force chief Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar is updated. Navy chief Vice Adm. David Saar Salama is not updated
05:30 to 06:29 IDF calls and assessments continued up until 6:29 a.m., when Hamas launches 4,300 rockets at Israel and 7,000 terrorists infiltrate the country. The ‘Tequila’ Special Operations SWAT team arrives on site at this time.
Khaybar, Khaybar, ya yahud! Jaish Muhammad soufa yaʿoud
The above Arabic chant is a rallying jihadi battle-slogan which is translated as “Khaybar, Khaybar, o Jews! The army of Muhammad will return!” It refers to the Battle of Khaybar of 628 AD, where the forces of Muhammad defeated, subjugated, massacred and expelled the Jewish community living in the Khaybar oasis (present-day Saudi Arabia). Today this slogan is chanted primarily at public anti-Israel demonstrations, and has been invoked during Islamist terrorist attacks as well. The chant has been categorized as antisemitic by (among others) the American news broadcaster PBS and the British advocacy group Muslims Against Antisemitism.
The murderous wave of Hamas’ jihadi attacks breached the Gaza–Israel barrier, attacking military bases and massacring civilians in 21 communities, including the kibbutzim Be’eri, Kfar Aza, Nir Oz, Netiv Ha’asara, and Alumim. The convoy was led by white Toyota pickup trucks filled with Nukhba terrorists, accompanied by motorcycles, bulldozers, speedboats, and powered paragliders. The jihadis 6,000 terrorists breached the border in 119 locations into Israel; this included 3,800 from the commando Nukhba forces, as well as 2,200 Gazan pro-Hamas civilians and other jihadi groups. Additionally, the IDF estimates that 1,000 Gazans within Gaza fired rockets against Israel, bringing the total number of participants on Hamas’s side to 7,000.
On recordings of Hamas commanders during the attack, one commander is heard saying: “Document the scenes of horror, now, and broadcast them on TV channels to the whole world! Slaughter them. End the children of Israel”
08:00 PLO/Palestinian Authority terrorists belonging to Fatah/al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades come down from Judea and Samaria, camouflaged in Israeli police uniforms and having flashing blue ‘Kojak’ lights on their cars. They redirect fleeing Israelis into Hamas ambushes (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nPJTeI1RMnE video clip at 0:00 – 0:20).
Trapped by the lawyers
Israel has been in the throes of a battle between conservative/traditional political parties on the one hand, and a woke/Left-wing juristocracy (also known as ‘judicial activism’) on the other. Judicial activism holds that courts can and should go beyond the applicable law to consider broader societal implications of their decisions (which are usually Left-leaning and anti-religious). It usually implies that judges make rulings based on their own views rather than on precedent.
Prior to the outbreak of the Israel-Gaza war, opponents of the present government attempted to overthrow PM Netanyahu’s coalition through hostile legal moves. Some oligarchs and previous Left-leaning Prime Ministers and Military/Intelligence heads have been co-opted into this movement targeting judicial reform.
The judicial figureheads of this anti-government movement include the Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara (who has been fired by the Knesset but refuses to quit). In the IDF, this role has been led by Maj. Gen. Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi, the Military Advocate General (MAG). They continue to manifest an anti-conservative, anti-religious and anti-traditional tendenz. They are at loggerheads with much of the IDF and the government, insisting on enforcing novel legal interpretations which place a stranglehold on the IDF and prevent it from decisively defeating Hamas, Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Republic.
On the morning of October 7, 2023 Major General Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi, the Chief Military Advocate, goes straight to the Kirya (Israel’s Pentagon) and sends out approximately 100 of her IDF lawyers in the regular and reserve ranks. These quickly arrive at all the important combat hubs: the commands and divisions, the Air Force and Navy, the operations and intelligence wings. They show up between 07:00 and 08:00.
At 08:10 the MAG overturns PM Netanyahu’s legal prerogative to call in the IAF and declare war. Instead, the military juristocracy forbade the IAF from bombing anywhere in Gaza. It took the Air Force 12 hours before it was able to act and seal off the border from Gazans rushing in and Hamas fighters taking hostages back.
At 11:30 PM Netanyahu again orders the IAF in, but his orders are overturned three more times by the MAG. The MAG also forbids approving open-fire orders to the IDF – which explains why soldiers and pilots refused to fire on Hamas terrorists for many hours, while Israelis were being slaughtered, raped, burned to death and kidnapped. One such example is Yair, an IDF soldier on a rapid response team, who calls up the IDF Central Command and pleads for reinforcements against the 50 Hamas terrorists he is fighting. He is told by an IAF fighter pilot “We don’t have legal permission to shoot in populated areas.” The fear of facing ‘lawfare’ attacks at the International Criminal Court in The Hague has blunted the sharp sword of the IDF. Most of the casualties on October 7, 2023 are integrally connected to this criminal policy of the IDF’s military juristocracy. Somehow the IDF has deferred to the courts. “The legal advisors were more concerned, apparently, with the lives of Gazan ‘civilians’ plundering southern settlements than with the lives of those dying of asphyxiation in their bomb shelters, being murdered in cold blood, or being assaulted.”
At 20:10 the Security Cabinet of the Israeli government gathers and retroactively approves the declaration of war and the open-fire orders. The MAG and the Attorney General then have no choice but to approve those declarations.
On October 9, 2023, two days after the murderous attack on Israel, Hamas terrorists were found near the Sde Teiman camp, a three minute drive from Be’er Sheva, where they were apprehended by the Duvdevan Special Forces unit.
What has been described in this newsletter is simultaneously sobering, infuriating and depressing. The IDF is world-famous for amazing acts of bravery, daring, courage and inventiveness, but occasionally it too has feet of clay – like other armies. The key to Israel’s victories must lie in its dependence on and faith in YHVH, the God of the armies of Israel.
- “Through God we will do valiantly, and it is He who will trample down our enemies” (Psalm 60:12)
- “The horse is prepared for the day of battle, but the victory belongs to YHVH” (Proverbs 21:31)
- “How should one chase a thousand, and two put ten thousand to flight, except their Rock had sold them, and YHVH had shut them up?” (Deuteronomy 32:30)
How shall we then pray?
- Pray for the leaders and the nation of Israel to be given the gift of repentance toward the God of Jacob, and the humility and courage to follow through in these areas
- Pray for the leaders and elders of Israel – in the domains of politics, in the military and intelligence, and in law – be given the wisdom to establish godliness, righteousness and truth in these spheres
- Pray for the entire people of Israel to seek and find their salvation – Messiah Yeshua
- Pray for the raising up of Ezekiel’s prophetic Jewish army throughout the earth!
Your prayers and support hold up our arms and are the very practical enablement of God to us in the work He has called us to do.
In Messiah Yeshua,
Avner Boskey
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